Parashat Pinchas
Zealotry – is it for Us?
In Parashat Pinchas, we read that God rewarded Pinchas for his act of zealotry. As told in Parashat Balak, Zimri, a leader from the tribe of Shimon, took a gentile woman named Kozbi in full view of Moshe and the entire nation. Pinchas zealously stabbed Zimri and Kozbi to death, an act that brought to a sudden halt a devastating divine plague that had killed 24,000 people among Benei Yisrael who had sinned with the women of Moav.
The concept of zealotry requires explanation. The Torah certainly mandates executing sinners, but only under very specific circumstances, and only within the system and framework of Beit Din (Rabbinical Court). The culprit must have been very clearly warned before committing the act, two witnesses must testify to the incident, they are interrogated by the court, and the court must thoroughly discuss and deliberate the matter before sentencing the sinner to death. Why is Pinchas rewarded for his violent act? Does the Torah encourage anybody who feels angry about a certain crime to go ahead and kill the transgressor?
Furthermore, if we look at the first instance of Jewish zealotry, we will find that it met with harsh condemnation. In Sefer Bereishit the Torah tells the story of Dina, who was raped in the city of Shechem. Two of her brothers, Shimon and Levi, reacted to this crime by killing every male in the city. When they returned home, expecting their father, Yaakov, to congratulate them on their heroic zealotry, he censured them for their violent conduct. Before his death, Yaakov again berates Shimon and Levi, accusing them of "stealing" the attributes of violence and bloodshed from their uncle, Esav. Yaakov very clearly felt that violent zealotry against sinners is not the Jewish way; Shimon and Levi usurped it from Esav.
Why, then, did God reward Pinchas? Why did Shimon and Levi's zealotry meet with harsh condemnation, while Pinchas' act earned God's approval and blessing?
The answer is that the Torah condones zealotry on the condition that it is motivated by nothing else but the pure, sincere concern to avenge God's honor. If the zealot acts with even a tinge of ulterior motives, in the interest of settling old accounts, because of his personal dislike for the sinner, or with any sense of enjoyment or gratification, then the zealotry becomes an act of murder. If a zealot's motives are even slightly fueled by any personal interests, he loses the right to zealotry.
After Yaakov's initial condemnation of Shimon and Levi's attack on Shechem, the brothers responded, "Should our sister be made into a harlot?" Perhaps unwittingly, Shimon and Levi here confessed to the ulterior motives that prompted their act of zealotry. They reacted as they did because of what was done to "our sister." Their anger resulted not from the insult to God, but from the insult to them, the infringement on their family honor. Their own mouths testified that what they committed was not an act of pure zealotry, but rather a violent reaction to personal insult.
In Parashat Pinchas, God Himself testifies to Pinchas' sincerity and the purity of his motives. Several times in this narrative, the Torah speaks of Zimri as "Ish Yisrael," the "Jewish man," rather than identifying him by name. The Torah thereby emphasizes that Zimri's identity was entirely irrelevant as far as Pinchas was concerned. Pinchas did not act as he did because of any personal vendetta against Zimri, but rather because a Jewish man perpetrated this grievous offense. His zealotry was sincere, and he was therefore rewarded.
Nobody today can assume the right of Kana'ut, zealotry, because nobody today can claim perfectly pure motives, without any element of personal interest. Even Moshe Rabbenu refrained from killing Zimri because of the possible involvement of ulterior motives. The Midrash tells that Zimri first approached Moshe and argued that he is permitted to take Kozbi, a woman from Midyan, just as Moshe had married Tzipora – a Midyanite. Moshe therefore could not respond zealously as Pinchas did, because an element of personal resentment would possibly be involved.
All the more so, then, we must not engage in zealous behavior of any kind. We may not even assume the right to humiliate people for their lack of observance, because there is always the possibility that some "settling of personal accounts" is what motivates such a response. And when we must point out to others their mistakes, it must be done very delicately, with the utmost respect and concern for the individual's feelings, rather than with a patronizing attitude of arrogance and one-upmanship. Rebuke and criticism are warranted only if one speaks with the pure, sincere desire to correct the individual's flaws, and not as a means of feeling a sense of superiority.
